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Hospital Knows Best: Court and 
Unfit Accused at the Mercy of 
Hospital Administrators – 
The Case of R. v. Conception1 
Suzan E. Fraser 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Canada, an accused will be considered to be unfit to stand trial if 
he or she is unable, on account of mental disorder, to conduct a defence 
or to instruct counsel to do so and, in particular, unable on account of 
mental disorder to 
(a) understand the nature or object of the proceedings, 
(b) understand the possible consequences of the proceedings, or 
(c) communicate with counsel.2 
In most cases, this occurs at the outset of the trial proceedings 
although the question of fitness can be considered at any stage of the 
proceedings before a verdict is rendered.3 
At the time of making a finding that an accused is unfit to stand trial, 
a judge may also make a treatment order pursuant to section 672.58 
requiring that the accused be treated for up to 60 days and that the 
accused submit to the treatment. Subsection 672.62(1) provides that a 
judge may make this order upon receiving the consent of person in 
charge of the hospital4 or the person providing the treatment (if treatment 
                                                                                                                       
* The writer acknowledges the work of Mercedes Perez, co-counsel with the writer for the 
Mental Health Legal Committee in the Conception case, and co-author of our factum in Conception, 
which assisted with the development of this article. 
1 [2014] S.C.J. No. 60, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 82 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conception”]. 
2 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 2 “unfit to stand trial”, and see also s. 672.22. 
3 Criminal Code, s. 672.23. 
4 “Person in charge” is a term used throughout Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code but it is not 
defined. In practice it is often the forensic director of the mental health facility or a person 
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is to be provided in the community) pursuant to section 672.62(1)(a) and 
(b) respectively.5 The Supreme Court of Canada considered the nature 
and constitutionality of that consent in R. v. Conception.6  
This article analyzes R. v. Conception, arguing that the case 
represents a departure from three decades of legal developments in the 
sphere of civil and forensic mental health law unified by the principles of 
restraint and oversight. That is, for the past 30 years, the law regarding 
the treatment of mentally disordered offenders has developed in a way 
that mandates, in all approaches regarding the mentally disordered 
person, the state should employ the least onerous, least restrictive 
mechanism consistent with public safety. Further, the article suggests that 
the decision cedes Court and tribunal oversight of the liberty interests of 
the unfit accused to unregulated hospital administrators, unless the unfit 
accused can establish a breach under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,7 an eventuality which would appear to be legally impossible 
given that by definition the unfit accused is likely unable to instruct 
defence counsel. The article asserts that the unfit accused persons, who are 
to be the subject of treatment orders, are unable legally to advance their 
Charter rights (having been found unfit). Drawing on the experiences of 
accused persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental 
disorder (“NCR accused”), the article suggests the Court’s expectation that 
the Charter will prevail and judges will maintain control over the unfit 
accused is unrealistic and practically impossible. Experience demonstrates 
that mentally disordered offenders will be left at the mercy of the 
discretion of hospital administrators and resource considerations. 
II. THE TREATMENT ORDER PROVISIONS AND THE UNFIT ACCUSED 
1. The Statutory Provisions 
As noted above, where a Court finds that an accused is unfit, it may 
also order that the accused be treated for a period of 60 days, if certain 
                                                                                                                       
designated by the facility to act in this capacity. There are no regulations governing the exercise of 
the powers of the person in charge. 
5 Criminal Code, s. 672.62(1). 
6 Supra, note 1. 
7 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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criteria are met. Section 672.58 of the Criminal Code permits a Court, 
upon a verdict of unfit to stand trial, to order an unfit accused to undergo 
treatment for a period not exceeding 60 days:  
672.58 Where a verdict of unfit to stand trial is rendered and the court 
has not made a disposition under section 672.54 in respect of an 
accused, the court may, on application by the prosecutor, by order, 
direct that treatment of the accused be carried out for a specified period 
not exceeding sixty days, subject to such conditions as the court 
considers appropriate and, where the accused is not detained in 
custody, direct that the accused submit to that treatment by the person 
or at the hospital specified. 
672.59(1) No disposition may be made under section 672.58 unless the 
court is satisfied, on the basis of the testimony of a medical 
practitioner, that a specific treatment should be administered to the 
accused for the purpose of making the accused fit to stand trial. 
(2) The testimony required by the court for the purposes of subsection (1) 
shall include a statement that the medical practitioner has made an 
assessment of the accused and is of the opinion, based on the grounds 
specified, that 
(a) the accused, at the time of the assessment, was unfit to stand trial; 
(b) the psychiatric treatment and any other related medical treatment 
specified by the medical practitioner will likely make the accused fit to 
stand trial within a period not exceeding sixty days and that without 
that treatment the accused is likely to remain unfit to stand trial; 
(c) the risk of harm to the accused from the psychiatric and other 
related medical treatment specified is not disproportionate to the 
benefit anticipated to be derived from it; and 
(d) the psychiatric and other related medical treatment specified is the least 
restrictive and least intrusive treatment that could, in the circumstances, 
be specified for the purpose referred to in subsection (1), considering 
the opinions referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c). 
Section 672.62(1)(a) prescribes that a treatment order shall not be 
issued without the consent of the person in charge: 
672.62(1) No court shall make a disposition under section 672.58 
without the consent of 
(a) the person in charge of the hospital where the accused is to be 
treated; or 
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(b) the person to whom responsibility for the treatment of the accused 
is assigned by the court. 
(2) The court may direct that treatment of an accused be carried out 
pursuant to a disposition made under section 672.58 without the 
consent of the accused or a person who, according to the laws of the 
province where the disposition is made, is authorized to consent for  
the accused. 
At issue in Conception was the statutory interpretation and constitutionality 
of the meaning of the consent required from the person in charge of the 
hospital contained in section 672.62(1)(a).  
2. Unfit Accused in the Criminal Process 
Unfit accused are always vulnerable, commonly psychotic and, by 
legal determination, unable to understand the nature, object or 
consequences of criminal proceedings or to instruct counsel.8 They, like 
every accused, are presumed innocent with specific legal and procedural 
rights guaranteed by the Charter.9  But unlike every accused, because 
they are deemed to be unfit, the Criminal Code permits their detention in 
hospital and, where statutory criteria in section 672.58 are met, treatment 
against their will in hospital in order to make them fit (a treatment order 
sometimes referred to as a “make fit” order).10  
Having been declared unfit to stand trial, unfit accused have little  
(or no) control over the legal process through which treatment orders are 
made. By definition, most unfit accused will not be in a position to 
instruct counsel on this issue or respecting their appeal rights.11 Notably, 
there are no reported cases of an unfit accused appealing from treatment 
orders.  
As discussed further below, unfit accused have been routinely 
imprisoned while awaiting a hospital bed for the implementation of a 
treatment order. In Ontario, unfit accused routinely wait in jail — a 
dangerous, overly restrictive and counter-therapeutic environment — 
without proper health care, until the State can accommodate them in a 
                                                                                                                       
8 Criminal Code, ss. 2 “unfit to stand trial”, 672.22. 
9 Charter, ss. 7-14. 
10 Criminal Code, s. 672.58. 
11 Criminal Code, ss. 2 “unfit to stand trial”, 672.22. 
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hospital. They are commonly denied bail, being unable to propose a 
release plan.  
In addition, those subject to a treatment order are denied the benefit 
of provincial health care legislation (and the common law), which would 
generally prohibit treatment without the consent of the person or a 
legally authorized substitute decision-maker and which provides a 
process for challenging treatment incapacity. Treatment without consent 
may be considered battery and/or assault.12 Where psychiatric 
medications are administered by force, the section 7 Charter guarantee to 
liberty and security of the person is engaged. Courts have repeatedly 
recognized that “[f]ew medical procedures can be more intrusive than the 
forcible injection of powerful mind-altering drugs which are often 
accompanied by severe and sometimes irreversible adverse side 
effects.”13  
In contrast, section 672.58 treatment orders require that the accused 
receive treatment even if he or she is capable and objects. The making of 
such an order renders the statutory presumption of capacity irrelevant, 
consent to treatment is bypassed, access to the Health Care Consent Act, 
1996,14 the review process of the Consent and Capacity Board (“CCB”) 
and the broad right of appeal from CCB decisions are denied, and prior 
capable wishes established through a power of attorney for personal care 
or otherwise are disregarded.15  
III. JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
1. Ontario Court of Justice 
In April 2010, Brian Conception appeared in the Ontario Court of 
Justice on charges of sexual assault. His alleged victim was a staff 
member at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (“CAMH”). After 
                                                                                                                       
12 Malette v. Shulman, [1990] O.J. No. 450, 72 O.R. (2d) 417, at 423-25 (Ont. C.A.); Health 
Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A (“HCCA”), ss. 4, 5, 10, 11, 14, 20, 21, 25, 27, 32, 
75, 80. Incapable persons can also apply to the Consent and Capacity Board (“CCB”) to appoint a 
representative of their choice: s. 33 HCCA. Prior capable wishes can be expressed in a power of 
attorney for personal care, in other written form or orally: HCCA, s. 5 and Substitute Decisions Act, 
1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, s. 46(1), (7). 
13 Fleming v. Reid, [1991] O.J. No. 1083, at paras. 23-27, 38-40, 4 O.R. (3d) 74 (Ont. C.A.); 
Starson v. Swayze, [2003] S.C.J. No. 33, at para. 75, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 722 (S.C.C.). 
14 S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A.  
15 See, infra, note 28.  
306 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
hearing medical evidence and submissions, the presiding judge found 
that Mr. Conception was unfit to stand trial. The medical evidence 
provided to the Court at the time was that the appellant met the criteria 
for a treatment order. Given that the alleged victim was a CAMH staff 
member, the Court heard that the treatment would be more appropriately 
delivered at the Mental Health Centre Penetanguishene — Oak Ridge 
Division, a maximum secure psychiatric facility, now divested and 
known as Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care. However, a bed 
would not be available for six days. 
After hearing of the delay, the presiding judge suggested that it was 
she who should determine priority, rather than hospital administrators, 
“observing that she did not make treatment orders lightly”.16 In the result, 
she issued a treatment order requiring that Mr. Conception be conveyed 
to “CAMH or designate (preferably Oak Ridge)” to receive treatment for 
the purpose of making him fit to stand trial, for a period of up to 60 days. 
The order also directed that he remain in custody at CAMH or designate 
and that he “be taken directly from Court to the designated hospital and 
from [the] hospital directly back to Court. Accused is not to be taken to a jail 
or correctional facility under any circumstances pursuant to this order”.17 
Correctional authorities transported the appellant to CAMH, which 
could not receive him and then onto Oak Ridge, where he was left in a 
hallway.18 He was ultimately treated notwithstanding that CAMH 
successfully sought a stay of the treatment order. In June, 2011, the 
charges against the appellant were stayed for reasons unknown to the 
author.  
2. Court of Appeal for Ontario 
CAMH and the Mental Health Centre — Penetanguishene, the two 
forensic mental health centres, appealed to the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario and sought an order allowing treatment pending appeal. The 
Court of Appeal for Ontario appointed amicus curiae (amicus)19 who 
                                                                                                                       
16 Centre for Addiction and Mental Health v. Ontario, [2012] O.J. No. 2253, at para. 15, 
2012 ONCA 342 (Ont. C.A.).  
17 Id., at para.18. 
18 A hallway at Oak Ridge is a hallway within the secure perimeter of the maximum secure unit. 
19 From 2000 to 2014, the Court of Appeal for Ontario had a specialized panel of lawyers to 
act as amicus curiae for matters involving mentally disordered accused and offenders. See Larissa 
Ruderman, “Amicus Curiae: Court of Appeal”, Honouring the Past, Shaping the Future,  
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assembled a substantial legislative fact record allowing for a full 
examination of the issues given that the accused was unfit and he would 
not have been able to instruct counsel to marshal such a record.  
The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal by the person in 
charge of CAMH because the trial judge failed to get consent before 
making a treatment order pursuant to sections 672.58 to 672.62 under 
Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code. The Court allowed the appeal, rejected 
the section 7 Charter challenge, finding that consent from the hospital 
included consent to when the order could be carried out. The Court 
specifically rejected the suggestion that a hospital could not decline on 
the basis of a bed shortage.20  
The Court of Appeal opined that the principal function of a  
section 672.58 order is not medical but legal: 
Treatment orders are made for the sole legal purpose of making an 
accused fit to stand trial on criminal charges. They are not intended to 
be therapeutic or for the medical benefit of the unfit accused in the 
broad sense.21 
Further, concerns about hospitals having discretion about the giving or 
withholding of consent could be answered by the fact that the consent 
requirement operated within “a broad legislative and regulatory framework 
that governs the conduct of hospital authorities and medical practitioners 
in relation to the acceptance and treatment of patients. Examples include 
the Mental Health Act,22 the Public Hospitals Act,23 the various health 
professions acts and the regulations under all of these statutes”.24  
3. Supreme Court of Canada 
Mr. Conception appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
appeal was heard when moot as Mr. Conception had received treatment 
and his charges were stayed. However, all the parties agreed that the 
underlying issues required resolution. The main issue on the appeal was 
whether the Court could make a treatment order directing that the 
                                                                                                                       
25th Anniversary Report of the Psychiatric Patient Advocate Office (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for 
Ontario, 2008), at 200.  
20 Centre for Addiction and Mental Health v. Ontario, supra, note 16, at paras. 28, 65.  
21 Id., at para. 61. 
22 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7. 
23 R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40. 
24 Id., at para. 70. 
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treatment begin immediately.25 The Court split 5-4 after a rehearing 
agreeing on the result but with vastly different approaches.26  
The majority rejected the appellant’s argument that a plain reading of 
subsection 672.62(1) in the context of Part XX.1 suggests that “consent” 
relates to the provision of treatment ordered pursuant to section 672.58. 
The majority held that consent included timing of the order: 
As s. 672.58 makes clear, a “disposition” ordering treatment under that 
section necessarily includes aspects relating to timing: it must set out a 
“specified period not exceeding sixty days” and it may be made 
“subject to such conditions as the court considers appropriate”, 
including presumably conditions related to timing. Moreover, a 
disposition comes into force on the day on which it is made or on any 
later day that the court specifies: s. 672.63.  
All of this makes it clear that a “disposition” under s. 672.58 
necessarily has a temporal aspect both as to its beginning and its ending 
and may include other conditions that the court considers it appropriate 
to impose.27 
..... 
Given that “disposition” is a defined term meaning the “order made by 
a court under section 672.58 ” and the Code explicitly requires the 
hospital’s consent to a disposition under that section, we see no 
possible ambiguity in the text of these provisions. Any possible doubt 
is dispelled by the clear distinction in s. 672.62 between, on the one 
hand, the hospital’s consent to the “disposition” which is required 
under s. 672.62(1) and, on the other hand, the accused’s consent to 
“treatment … carried out pursuant to a disposition” which is not 
required. We do not see how Parliament could have more clearly 
expressed its intent that the hospital’s consent in s. 672.62(1) relates to 
all the provisions of the disposition, including when treatment will 
begin as well as what is to be done.28 
                                                                                                                       
25 Conception, supra, note 1, at para. 2 (per Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. for the majority) 
and para. 48 (per Karakatsanis J., for the concurring reasons). 
26 The decision was rendered after a video re-hearing by Gascon J., who was appointed after 
the Conception case had been heard and following the successful challenge to the judicial 
appointment of Nadon J. (Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 
SCC 21 (S.C.C.)), who had been sidelined at the time of the hearing. 
27 Conception, supra, note 1, at paras. 18-19. 
28 Id., at para. 24. 
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On the other hand, Karakatsanis J., after considering the full 
statutory context, in her concurring reasons, stated: 
… before a judge can make a treatment order, the consent provisions 
under s. 672.62(1) require that a hospital must have indicated it would 
be willing to administer the specified treatment. When read in their full 
context, the consent provisions do not permit hospitals to assess the 
priority of the accused against others on the waiting list ― or to 
withhold consent on the basis of its bed shortages or waitlists. Consent 
may be withheld only for medical reasons.29 
She specifically acknowledged “consideration of the significant Charter-
protected section 7 liberty interests at stake in the regime is ‘built into the 
[Part XX.1] statutory framework’ at ‘every step of the process’: 
Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
2004 SCC 20, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 498, at para. 53. See also Winko v. British 
Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, at paras. 16 
and 42.”30  
The majority found the section did not deprive the appellant of 
procedural fairness, and that it was not unconstitutionally vague or 
arbitrary and that the evidence did not establish a Charter breach 
occasioned by the six-day delay.31 The majority did accept that, in what it 
considered would be rare circumstances, that the Charter rights of the 
unfit accused could be implicated and that in such circumstances it 
would be the judge, rather than hospital administrators, who would have 
the last word.32 As a result, it is only in those cases where there is a 
Charter breach that a judge can overrule the hospital’s consent on the 
question of the timing of a treatment order.  
In Karakatsanis J.’s concurring reasons, despite disagreeing on the 
interpretation of the reading of sections 672.58 to 672.62 and finding that 
the trial judge had jurisdiction to make the order on a forthwith basis, she 
found that the trial judge erred in so doing. That decision, Karakatsanis J. 
opined, ought to be based on the specific factors of the case (not out of 
frustration with the mental health system). These, in her view, include the 
impact on the offender’s treatment prospects resulting from a delay; the 
holding conditions in the jail where he would likely be sent to wait; or 
any possible alternatives to detention while waiting for a bed; whether 
                                                                                                                       
29 Id., at para. 125. 
30 Id., at para. 90. 
31 Id., at paras. 41-42. 
32 Id., at para. 43. 
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the hospital could safely administer treatment immediately, if so ordered; 
or when safe treatment could be provided, if he was given priority.33  
The majority appears to have been motivated by a hands-off 
approach to health professionals because, in its view, the statutory 
provision was unique “in that it requires an accused to be subject to 
treatment and authorizes medical personnel to administer it without the 
accused’s consent”.34 This reluctance to order an unwilling health 
professional to treat, appears to have driven the result. However, in 
making this statement, the Court ignored the evidence before it: 
consenting to administering treatment was to be presumed. Specifically, 
as noted above, CAMH’s consent was to be presumed, subject to three 
days’ notice. This evidence clearly undermines the majority’s reasoning. 
It was clear to the Court that the hospital’s concern was about timing, not 
about being asked to do something that it did not want to. Finally, the 
majority’s reasoning ignores that the Court, under section 672.58 
requires evidence from a health practitioner about the treatment to be 
ordered.  
IV. CONCEPTION A DEPARTURE FROM PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT 
AND OVERSIGHT 
With that history, this article now examines how in reaching its 
decision, the Court departed from three decades’ work of reform — 
reform based upon the principle of restraint, emphasized fundamental 
fairness to the accused and created supervision over the assessment and 
treatment of mentally disordered persons in the criminal justice system. 
This portion of the article analyzes that reform and the Conception 
decision in light of it.  
1. History of Mental Disorder Provisions and Part XX.1  
of the Criminal Code 
The mental disorder provisions in the Criminal Code, including 
sections 672.58 and 672.62, are located in Part XX.1 of the Criminal 
Code and came into force in February 1992. Prior to this, unfit accused 
were detained following a finding that they were unfit to stand trial “until 
                                                                                                                       
33 Id., at para. 132. 
34 Id., at para. 28. 
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the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor of the Province [was] known” 
and the plea discharged (without prejudice to the accused being tried 
subsequently). As with the treatment of the then insane acquittees, the 
Lieutenant Governor was empowered under the Criminal Code to 
maintain the accused in safe custody or, if in the interest of the accused 
and not contrary to the interests of the public, discharge the accused 
absolutely or conditionally. As of 1969, the Lieutenant Governors of each 
province had a statutory discretion to appoint boards of review who were 
required to review the detention of unfit accused persons within  
six months of their initial disposition and every year thereafter. The 
boards had recommendation powers but the ultimate decision to detain or 
discharge an accused rested wholly within the discretion of the Lieutenant 
Governor. Thus, prior to the 1992 amendments, the Lieutenant Governor 
had an unfettered discretion in respect of a mentally disordered 
offender’s detention whether they were unfit to stand trial or not guilty 
by reason of insanity. In provinces without boards of review there were 
no provisions mandating any review of the detention of an unfit 
accused.35 
The process of reform of the forensic patient system began with the 
1976 report of the Law Reform Commission of Canada entitled A Report 
to Parliament on Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process. The 
Commission advanced the guidelines for dealing with a mentally 
disordered individual, in the criminal law process: 
1. When dealing with a mentally disordered individual, the criminal 
law process should be invoked only when it is the best available 
alternative. Implicit in this guideline is the assumption that 
increased emphasis will be placed on the pre-trial diversion of the 
mentally ill. 
2. Mentally disordered individuals are entitled to the same procedural 
fairness and should benefit from the same protections of personal 
liberty as other persons. In this regard extreme caution should be 
exercised before there is any deprivation of personal liberty in the 
form of psychiatric examination or treatment. As well, psychiatric 
treatment of any kind should only be given after obtaining the 
consent of the individual, subject only to the limited exceptions 
outlined later in this report. 
                                                                                                                       
35 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 537  
[am. S.C. 1991, c. 43, s. 3], 615-619 [all repealed S.C. 1991, c. 43, s. 3]. 
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3. In those circumstances where some form of detention is deemed 
necessary, it must be subject to review and in no circumstances 
should it be indeterminate.36 
With respect to what order ought to follow a finding of unfitness, the 
Commission recommended an end to the delegation of power over unfit 
accused to the provincial Lieutenant Governors stating that the Court was 
in the best position to consider the situation of the unfit accused. Further, 
the Commission opined that a judge be entitled to make three different 
orders: release forthwith for a chronically unfit accused who presents as 
no danger to self or other; an order for treatment as an outpatient; and 
mandatory hospitalization for a period of six months to be reviewed 
including the use of provincial mental health legislation.37 The 
Government of Canada’s response to the Commission’s Report included 
the formation of a Mental Disorder Project (“MDP”). The MDP was 
instructed to prepare a set of recommendations that could be used as the 
basis for amending the relevant legislation. The underlying policy adopted 
by the MDP is set out in the MDP’s Final Report dated September 1985: 
A guiding force for the Criminal Law Review is the Government of 
Canada publication, The Criminal Law in Canadian Society (CLCS). 
While the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s 1976 Report to 
Parliament on Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process is a most 
helpful guide in directing appropriate alternatives for consideration in 
this area, the CLCS document establishes a blueprint from which much 
of the philosophy behind the discussion in this paper flows. 
The central principle set out in the CLCS document is that the criminal 
law should be used with restraint. The least restrictive form of 
intervention in the circumstances should be used.38 
In terms of the initial disposition and continuing review of those persons 
found unfit to stand trial, the MDP, in its Final Report, underscored the need 
for restraint and the use of the least intrusive “intervention”: 
One of the recurring themes of the Criminal Law in Canadian Society 
(CLCS) document is that the least restrictive form of intervention 
                                                                                                                       
36 Law Reform Commission of Canada, A Report to Parliament on Mental Disorder in the 
Criminal Process (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977), at 7; E.A. Tollefson &  
B. Starkman, Mental Disorder in the Criminal Proceedings (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1993), at 1-2. 
37 A Report to Parliament on Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process, id., at 17-18. 
38 Mental Disorder Project: Criminal Law Review – Final Report (Ottawa: Department of 
Justice, 1985), at 5. 
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necessitated by the circumstances should be used, and that one must 
always be mindful of the doctrine of restraint. The principle of using the 
least intrusive or restrictive mechanism necessary in the circumstances is 
of particular importance when one considers the matter of the disposition 
of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity or unfit to stand trial.39 
In keeping with its underlying theme of restraint and least onerous 
and least restrictive intervention, the MDP went on to make sweeping 
recommendations in respect of mental disorders and criminal law. 
Those recommendations formed the basis for the current forensic 
system as set out in the Code, including the provisions pertaining to 
review hearings respecting persons found unfit.40 
As noted above, the policy context for the MDP recommendations 
was informed by the Government of Canada’s 1982 publication entitled 
The Criminal Law in Canadian Society (“CLCS”). The CLCS was 
published by the Federal Department of Justice for the purpose of setting 
out the policy of the Government of Canada with respect to the purpose 
and principles of criminal law in the context of the recently enacted 
Charter. The CLCS re-affirmed, as a fundamental principle, that criminal 
law is to be employed with restraint. This fundamental principle, in turn, 
was premised on the rationale that Canadian society places a high value 
on freedom and humanity: 
Restraint should be used in employing the criminal law because the 
basic nature of criminal law sanctions is punitive and coercive, and, 
since freedom and humanity are valued so highly, the use of other non-
coercive, less formal, and more positive approaches is to be preferred 
wherever possible and appropriate.41 
And further: 
The Ouimet Report stated “as a fundamental proposition that 
interference with individual liberty can only be justified where it is 
clearly necessary in the interests of society as a whole, and that no 
greater interference with individual liberty than is necessary to protect 
the interests of society as a whole is justifiable”. 
This formulation could also be applied to the process of determination 
of dispositions, to require the availability of a range of sanctions in law, 
an onus to apply the least restrictive form of sanction adequate to the 
                                                                                                                       
39 Mental Disorder Project, id., at 33. 
40 Mental Disorder Project, id., at 40, 41, 44, 49, 50, 52-55; Tollefson & Starkman, supra, 
note 36, at 3-4. 
41 The Criminal Law in Canadian Society (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1982), at 42. 
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circumstances, and a requirement to restrict the amount of that sanction 
to that which is justifiably necessary and adequate.42 
The principle of least restrictive intervention is a principle found 
throughout mental health law. As noted by Jocelyn Downie: 
… this criterion, even if not required by legislatures, but rather 
superimposed by courts, health care professionals, and other legal 
decision-makers, protects the individual’s dignity and autonomy far 
better than untrammelled use of the concepts of “dangerousness” and 
“incompetence”. The least restrictive (and least onerous or intrusive) 
alternative guarantees that at a minimum some residuum of liberty and 
autonomy will be preserved for the person with a mental disability 
where legitimate and compelling state interests do justify some action 
... Indeed, any decision made concerning the status of a person with a 
mental disability that does not incorporate the least restrictive principle 
risks being seen as illegitimate and may also be subject to legal and 
constitutional challenge.43  
The mental disorder provisions of the Criminal Code were 
comprehensively amended in 1992 as Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code 
and therein section 672.58 was enacted.  
The amendments substantially altered the forensic mental health 
landscape by ending the unfettered discretion of the Provincial 
Lieutenant Governors and the hospitals to which that discretion was 
delegated and placing the management of mentally disordered persons in 
the criminal justice system with Courts and review Boards. The Supreme 
Court of Canada in Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric 
Institute) (although considering the situation of a person found not 
criminally responsible on account of mental disorder) found that the  
new Part XX.1 replacing the common law was “a new approach 
emphasizing individualized assessment and the provision of 
opportunities for treatment” where the accused was to be treated in the 
least onerous, least restrictive fashion consistent with public safety.44 
While Winko was focused on section 672.54 as it applied to the NCR 
accused, the Court’s comments apply to the scheme of Part XX.1 as a 
                                                                                                                       
42 Id., at 48. 
43 J. Downie et al., Canadian Health Law and Policy (Markham, ON: Butterworths, 2002), 
at 278-80. 
44 Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] S.C.J. No. 31,  
at paras. 42-43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Winko”]. 
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whole. In addition, section 672.54 relates to unfit accused as well as NCR 
accused as it is the disposition-making provision for unfit accused persons. 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada in Pinet v. St. Thomas 
Psychiatric Hospital and Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. 
Ontario (Attorney General) [Tulikorpi], the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that the least onerous, least restrictive test applied to the package of 
conditions attached to a disposition. At the time of the hearing of R. v. 
Conception, therefore, there existed a long line of Supreme Court of 
Canada cases that directed an interpretation of Part XX.1 of the Criminal 
Code that complied with the Charter.45 While those cases dealt primarily 
with NCR accused, it was the Court’s interpretation about the scheme of 
Part XX.1 and the principles underlying it which make the arguments in 
those cases applicable to the unfit accused. Even recent amendments, 
which alter the language of section 672.54 to “necessary and 
appropriate”, leave the principle of least restrictive, least onerous intact.46 
The decision of the majority produced a result that practically 
undermines the twin branches of Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code, 
namely, the assessment and treatment of the accused.47 By exposing the 
unfit accused in need of a treatment order to detention in jail where he is 
vulnerable, the decision appears to violate a primary purpose of Part 
XX.1 of the Criminal Code: the fair treatment of the accused.48 It is also 
for those reasons that the experiences of the NCR accused when their 
liberty is managed by hospital administrators, as discussed further below, 
are relevant to the question of whether the Court ought to have retained 
more robust supervision over treatment orders. 
2. Court’s Departure from Principle of Restraint and Oversight 
The Supreme Court of Canada had ample evidence of the onerous 
nature of detention in jail in the circumstances in which an unfit accused 
meets the criteria for a treatment order. In particular, there was no dispute 
                                                                                                                       
45 Winko, id.; Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital, [2003] S.C.J. No. 66, 2004 SCC 21 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pinet”]; Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 67, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 498 (S.C.C.) (Tulikorpi, appellant); Mazzei v. British Columbia 
(Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric Services), [2006] S.C.J. No. 7, 2006 SCC 7 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Mazzei”]. 
46 Re Osawe, [2015] O.J. No. 2050, at para. 45, 2015 ONCA 280 (Ont. C.A.). 
47 Winko, supra, note 44, at paras. 39-43. 
48 Winko, id., at paras. 20, 21, 33, 35-39, 41-43. Mazzei, supra, note 45, at paras. 27, 28, 32: 
“fair treatment” refers to procedural fairness, as well as the promotion of dignity and the 
minimization of infringements on liberty. 
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that the detention was perilous and anti-therapeutic. The legislative fact 
evidence, filed by the Amicus Curiae at the Court of Appeal (forming 
part of the Appellant’s record at the Supreme Court of Canada and relied 
on by the Court), revealed that since the mid-1990s, the number of 
mentally disordered persons (unfit and NCR) under the jurisdiction of the 
Ontario Review Board grew by a rate of approximately 5 per cent 
annually while the supply of forensic beds had not kept pace. In addition, 
a related shortage of community mental health resources for forensic 
mental health patients meant that those detained in hospital could not 
cascade out into the community with support. In short, the system was 
plugged.  
While Mr. Conception would have been required to wait six days for 
a bed, many unfit and NCR accused awaiting transfer to a psychiatric 
facility, or between facilities or security levels, often must wait months or 
years. Delayed transfers prolong detentions that are not least onerous and 
least restrictive. They slow or prohibit opportunities for rehabilitation  
and community reintegration and can trigger deterioration in the 
accused’s mental state.49 These problems were the subject of concern by  
                                                                                                                       
49 Re Boucher, [2012] O.R.B.D. No. 1120, at para. 15: “It is unconscionable that there has 
been a delay of over a year in effecting the transfer of Mr. Boucher in accordance with the Board’s 
prior Disposition Order. Delays such as this threaten to undermine the spirit and purpose of the 
legislative scheme designed to protect the public while at the same time furthering the important 
legislative objective of ensuring that NCR accused are not treated as convicted criminals.”;  
Re Krivicic, [2012] O.R.B.D. No. 2247, at para. 139: delayed transfer of 12 to 36 months;  
Re Elampooranam, [2012] O.R.B.D. No. 760, at para. 17 “… the Board notes its great concern that 
Mr. Elampooranam has been on the waiting list for more than a year. In particular, he has apparently 
been told since December that he is at the ‘top of the list’ for transfer to CAMH, but at the time of 
the hearing in late March, that still had not occurred. The characterization of his position as ‘top of 
the list’ appears in that light to be at best misleading and at worst nonsensical.”; Re Kline, [2013] 
O.R.B.D. No. 98, at para. 17: “The evidence is that there are only three intrahospital transfers a year 
into CAMH. As a result of this unfortunate circumstance, he may have to spend years waiting for an 
opportunity to be where the supports for him are most ideal. This is lamentable.”; Re Leclair, [2009] 
O.R.B.D. No. 162, at para. 17: delayed transfer of at least nine months — “The evidence before the 
Board is that Mr. Leclair’s stress has been exacerbated by the failure of the Royal Ottawa Hospital to 
effect Mr. Leclair’s transfer. The ongoing uncertainty as to whether he will be going, and when, has 
been the foundation of Mr. Leclair’s destabilization.”; Re Savory, [2012] O.R.B.D. No. 1987,  
at paras. 11, 18, 20: delayed transfer of at least one year; Re George, [2012] O.R.B.D. No. 2033,  
at paras. 15, 17: “The evidence is clear that Mr. George arrived at Waypoint, not because his risk 
required him to be placed in a maximum security facility, but rather because there were no beds 
available anywhere else in a less secure facility. … Having remained on the waiting list for transfer 
for some seven months, he may yet have a lengthy wait until his transfer.”; Re Dass, [2011] 
O.R.B.D. No. 439, at paras. 34, 39-43: wait time for transfer indeterminate; Re Aganeh, [2008] 
O.R.B.D. No. 2, at para. 23: four-month delay, accused’s mental state deteriorated as a result;  
Re Lucas, [2011] O.R.B.D. No. 68, at paras. 31-36: at least six-month delay; Re McClinton, [2010] 
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many.50 While some of these cases related to inter-hospital transfers of 
NCR accused, they bear consideration on the onerous nature of detention 
in a higher level of security than required and the impact of that detention 
on rehabilitation. 
Unfit accused are also vulnerable when imprisoned awaiting a 
hospital bed. Mental health resources vary in availability and quality 
across Ontario’s remand and correctional facilities. The care offered to 
unfit accused in prison is of poorer quality than that offered in 
psychiatric facilities. Segregation and restraint are commonly used to 
manage and/or punish unfit accused and are often carried out by 
unqualified staff.51  Mentally ill individuals have died while detained in 
prisons.52  In at least one facility, nurses often assess mental health 
through the food slot in the cell door.53  
There was no dispute in the appeal that unfit accused subject to 
treatment orders are better off in a psychiatric facility than in jail. This is 
not to say that mental health facilities are always kinder and gentler 
facilities. One need only look at the verdict from the coroner’s jury at the 
inquest into the death of Kulmiye Aganeh and the seclusion cell where he 
                                                                                                                       
O.R.B.D. No. 1385, at para. 35: anticipated eight-month delay.; Re Morgado, [2012] O.R.B.D.  
No. 623, at paras. 31-32: anticipated 10- or 11-month delay; Re Blake, [2011] O.R.B.D. No. 610: 
delay of indeterminate length.  
50 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Select Committee on Mental Health and Addictions, 
“Navigating the Journey to Wellness: The Comprehensive Mental Health and Addictions Action 
Plan for Ontarians” (Toronto: Legislative Assembly of Ontario, August 2010), at 7, 8, 11 and 20-21); 
Janet Leiper, “Cracks in the Façade of Liberty: The Resort to Habeas Corpus to Enforce Part XX.1 
of the Criminal Code” (2009-2010) 55 Crim. L.Q. 134; Contained in the legislative fact record were 
many similar fact cases involving unfit accused ordered treated pursuant to s. 672.58(2). See R. v. 
Rosete, [2006] O.J. No. 1608, 2006 ONCJ 141 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Consuelo, unreported (September 14, 
2010), Toronto, Court File Nos. 10-10001715, 10-10004017, 10-70009469 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. 
Hneihen, [2010] O.J. No. 4115, 261 C.C.C. (3d) 375 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Procope, unreported 
(October 6, 2010), Toronto, Court File Nos. 10009107, 1200160 (Ont. C.J.). Most of these unfit 
accused were represented by duty counsel. 
51 From the legislative fact evidence filed: Affidavit of Graham Glancy, Vol. V, Appellant’s 
Record, p. 2, paras. 4-6; Affidavit of Eduardo Almeida, Vol. II, Appellant’s Record, p. 2, para. 2; 
Cross-Examination of E. Almeida, Vol. III, Appellant’s Record, p. 10, line 14 to p. 11, line 15; 
“Report of Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security on Mental Health and 
Addictions in Federal Corrections’, Ex. B, Affidavit of E. Almeida, Vol. II, Appellant’s Record, p. 22. 
52 Verdict of Coroner’s Jury into the death of Joshua Douglas Durnford, unreported (August 
31, 2001); Verdict of Coroner’s Jury into the death of Glenn Keigo White, 2009 CanLII 92011  
(ON OCCO) (Office of the Chief Coroner of Ontario); Coroner’s Jury Verdict James O’Brian, Ex. 
A: Affidavit of E. Almeida, Vol. II, Appellant’s Record, p. 6; Coroner’s Jury Verdict D.M., Ex. C: 
Affidavit of E. Almeida, Vol. II, Appellant’s Record, p. 114. 
53 Cross-Examination of Graham Glancy, Vol. V, Appellant’s Record, p. 48, l. 1-3. 
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spent the last months of his life, coming out only in restraints, to know 
that our psychiatric facilities can be punitive and isolating warehouses.54 
However, but for the issue of bed availability, there is and was also 
no dispute that once a treatment order is made, unfit accused should be 
admitted to a psychiatric facility immediately. Indeed, pursuant to the 
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between Toronto’s Mental 
Health Court and the respondent CAMH, consent to treatment was 
presumed subject to a three-day notice period.55 In his evidence,  
Dr. Simpson, as the person in charge, candidly agreed that CAMH will 
consent to every treatment order and that hospital consent relates entirely 
to the timing of the order due to bed shortages, not to willingness to 
implement the treatment order or lack of professional expertise.56  
The majority made no reference to the vulnerability of the unfit 
accused awaiting placement in a hospital or the implementation of a 
treatment order despite the evidence filed. Nor did it balance that 
vulnerability and the position of the accused is concluding that section 7 
breaches would be “rare”. The only mention in the majority of the least 
restrictive aspect was with respect to the statutory criteria that require 
that the treatment be least restrictive. There is no nod to the greater 
liberty interests of the accused. If the Court had had the accused liberty 
interests at the forefront, it would have considered how to reconcile its 
statutory interpretation with the overly restrictive and counter-therapeutic 
situation of the unfit accused awaiting treatment in jail. In ignoring these 
questions, the Court departed from three decades of reform that advanced 
the least onerous, least restrictive approach.  
                                                                                                                       
54 Jury Verdict, Inquest into the Death of Kulmiye Aganeh, unreported (December 19, 
2014), Recommendation #22 states: “Waypoint ensure that patients in seclusion should not be 
punished. They should not be denied canteen, access to water, showers and/or religious practices.” 
55 Affidavit of Dr. Simpson, Vol. VI, Appellant’s Record, p. 136, para. 33; Ex. A, Affidavit 
of Dr. Simpson, Memorandum of Understanding (May 4, 2005), Vol. VI, Appellant’s Record,  
pp. 159, 160. The MOU “will constitute consent by the person-in-charge to treatment orders, on the 
condition that they are organized as specified here, and no further consent need be sought”. CAMH’s 
“Statement of Principles and Practice for Admissions Prioritization” also provides consent to treat: 
“It will be presumed by the court that the LAMHP will consent to treat (s. 672.62) all accused who 
have been found ‘unfit to stand trial’ and in respect of whom the criteria set out in s. 672.59 of the 
Criminal Code have been met at the conclusion of a Crown application for a Treatment Order.”  
Ex. Q, Affidavit of Dr. Simpson, Vol. VII, Appellant’s Record, p. 186. 
56 Affidavit of Dr. Simpson, Vol. VI, Appellant’s Record, p. 132, para. 20; Cross-
examination of Dr. Simpson, Appellant’s Record, Vol. VII, pp. 41, 42, 61, 62, 121. 
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V. MANAGEMENT OF LIBERTY INTERESTS BY HOSPITAL 
ADMINISTRATORS 
The experience of the management of liberty interests by hospital 
administrators informs the analysis of the prioritization of those unfit 
accused persons ordered treated by the Court. Once a Court or review 
board makes a disposition, section 672.57 allows a delegation of the 
powers within the limits of the disposition to the person in charge of the 
hospital where a person is detained. This delegation makes the person in 
charge responsible for the management of the liberty of NCR and unfit 
accused persons on a day-to-day basis. As well, review boards regularly 
make orders for assessment and orders transferring unfit and NCR 
accused from one forensic psychiatric facility to another or from one 
security level to another. Transfer orders are also made to ensure that 
unfit and NCR accused are subject to the least onerous and least 
restrictive disposition.57  
Each of these types of orders directly impact the Charter rights of 
psychiatric patients. These orders are often made to facilitate the 
accused’s cascade through the forensic system towards an absolute 
discharge. Hospital administrators manage orders for assessment and 
transfer. The review boards possess no enforcement powers.58 Where the 
review board delegates powers to the person in charge of a hospital by a 
disposition order, the hospital is expected to exercise its delegated 
powers in the least restrictive manner possible.59 All of which is to say 
that pre-Conception, hospital administrators already possessed 
significant powers to affect the liberty of mentally disordered persons in 
the criminal justice system but subject to the oversight of the Courts and 
the review boards.  
As noted above, the issue of delay by hospital administrators in the 
transferring and/or admitting of forensic mental health patients has been 
the subject of extensive litigation in Ontario. In some cases, Courts have 
recognized that transfer orders must be expeditious to avoid unjustified 
interference with Charter rights, whereas in other cases Courts have 
deferred to hospital concerns respecting bed shortages.60  
                                                                                                                       
57 Criminal Code, ss. 672.11, 672.54. 
58 Conway v. Barbaree, [2010] O.J. No. 2466, at paras. 33-34, 215 C.R.R. (2d) 230  
(Ont. S.C.J.). 
59 R. v. C. (M.L.), [2010] O.J. No. 5310, at paras. 43-45, 2010 ONCA 843 (Ont. C.A.).  
60 Orru v. Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, [2004] O.J. No. 5203, 126 C.R.R. (2d) 182 
(Ont. S.C.J.); Pinet, supra, note 45; Centre for Addiction and Mental Health v. Al-Sherawadi, [2011] 
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Given the divergent streams of judicial reasoning in this area, even 
habeas corpus and mandamus have, in some cases, been withheld from 
accused awaiting transfers.61 Those cases reveal that it takes a Court to 
enforce orders and, where the Court does not, an (NCR or unfit) accused 
can wait for an indeterminate period of time for the implementation of an 
order by hospital administrators. 
In deciding that Courts must defer to hospital administrators, the 
Court of Appeal in Conception relied on The Person in Charge of Mental 
Health Centre Penetanguishene v. HMQ, Thomas Rea, The Person in 
Charge of Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.62 In Rea, the 
respondents CAMH and the Mental Health Centre Penetanguishene63 
argued that the Review Board failed to include “a residual discretion 
clause” which would permit a hospital to detain a person pending 
transfer to another secure facility and that without such residual 
discretion, the hospital remained vulnerable to a habeas corpus 
application. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal acknowledging 
resource concerns. In so doing, the Court undermined the ability of NCR 
accused to seek extraordinary remedies if a transfer order is not executed.  
As noted above, lengthy waiting lists in the Review Board system 
persist. Practically speaking, those subject to Part XX.1 remain 
warehoused awaiting transfer. Residual clauses are routinely incorporated 
into disposition orders in Ontario where a delay in transfer is 
anticipated.64 These clauses purport to provide lawful authority for 
detentions that would otherwise be unlawful because they are not the 
least onerous and least restrictive.65 When habeas corpus is denied over 
resource considerations, the result is that NCR accused are being 
maintained in more restrictive settings pending transfer with no legal 
                                                                                                                       
O.J. No. 1755, 2011 ONSC 2272 (Ont. S.C.J.); Fortune v. Centre for Addiction and Mental Health 
(2009), Ontario Superior Court of Justice (unreported decision of the Honourable Justice J. MacDonald, 
Docket 09-7000-0306).  
61 R. v. Chen, [2012] O.J. No. 4038, 2012 ONSC 4889 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
62 Reported as Mental Health Centre Penetanguishene v. Ontario, [2010] O.J. No. 1044, 
260 O.A.C. 125 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Rea”]. 
63 Appellants in Rea. 
64 Re Boucher, supra, note 49, at para. 25; Re Elampooranam, supra, note 49, at paras. 26-
27; Re Kline, supra, note 49, at para. 23; Re Savory, supra, note 49, at para. 19; Re George, supra, 
note 49, at paras. 15-19; Re Dass, supra, note 49, at paras. 41-49; Re Morgado, supra, note 49,  
at paras. 29-32; Re Blake, supra, note 49, at paras. 9, 16-19; Re Williams, [2010] O.R.B.D. No. 1257, 
at para. 29; Re Just, [2013] O.R.B.D. No. 1308, at paras. 37, 45.  
65 Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J.  
No. 67, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 498, paras. 51-56 (S.C.C.) (Tulikorpi, appellant). 
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recourse. It should be noted that many of these cases involved people who 
had counsel through the review board system and had been progressing. In 
contrast with unfit accused, they were capable of instructing counsel to 
argue for an unwarranted restriction of their liberties. 
The peril of a pragmatic approach that gives deference to resource 
concerns is that such deference comes at the expense of fundamental 
human rights. The Court of Appeal’s focus on resources in Rea appeared 
to impair access to the writ of habeas corpus as a means to enforce 
orders of the Board. Significantly, there were no reported extraordinary 
remedy applications after the release of Rea and the hearing of 
Conception. In the absence of judicial pressure to ensure adequate 
suitable resources for mentally disordered accused, the hospital wait list 
becomes all powerful. 
In the civil mental health context, the CCB has recently been 
authorized under the Mental Health Act to order transfers of patients 
from one hospital to another. One criterion the CCB must consider is 
whether the potential receiving hospital “is able to provide for the 
patient’s care and treatment”.66 A narrow interpretation of this criterion 
would require only that the hospital be able to accommodate the security 
and treatment needs of the patient, whereas a broader interpretation will 
permit the potential receiving hospital to refuse to consent based on bed 
availability. However, in December, 2014, a five-member panel of the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario struck down provisions of Ontario’s Mental 
Health Act as they pertain to long-term detainees.67 It remains to be seen 
how the Government of Ontario remedy the issues arising from S. (P.) v. 
Ontario. 
Similarly, section 22 of the Mental Health Act provides that a judge 
may remand a person charged with an offence and suffering from mental 
disorder for admission to a psychiatric facility for a maximum period of 
two months. However, the judge cannot make such an order without first 
determining whether the services of the psychiatric facility “are 
available”.68 Notably, the CAMH’s MOU provides that section 22 Mental 
Health Act orders will be effected within a maximum wait time of four 
weeks.69 This prioritization highlights the arbitrariness of the status quo.  
                                                                                                                       
66 Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 39.2(10)(a). 
67 S. (P.) v. Ontario, [2014] O.J. No. 6151, 123 O.R. (3d) 651 (Ont. C.A.). 
68 Mental Health Act, ss. 22-23. 
69 Ex. A, Affidavit of Dr. Simpson, Memorandum of Understanding, Vol. VI, Appellant’s 
Record, at 159, 160.  
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As we can see above, without meaningful supervision and 
enforcement powers, the delays persist. The impact on the unfit accused 
is more pronounced. The unfit accused detained in jail may be in solitary 
confinement or otherwise segregated without counsel. By definition they 
are unable to instruct counsel. In Conception, the appellant had the 
benefit of amicus at the Court of Appeal appointed from the Court of 
Appeal’s panel but the appeal was initiated by the hospital. Practically 
speaking, it is hard to imagine that unfit accused persons would be able 
to bring an application to the Court to challenge the nature of their 
detention or the failure of hospital administrators to implement a 
treatment order.  
VI. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK DOES NOT  
REGULATE HOSPITAL CONSENT 
While the intervener MHLC argued that the provincial hospital 
statutory and regulatory framework relied upon by the Court of Appeal 
as a check on the hospital power to give or withhold consent, the 
majority did not address that framework in its reasons. It did, however, 
state that subsection 672.62(1) “is not concerned simply with admission 
but with treatment upon admission”.70  
On examination, that statutory framework does not appear to actually 
check hospital power in the way envisaged by the Court of Appeal. 
Despite the majority question not specifically addressing that framework, 
understanding it remains important for understanding what power 
hospital administrators have under those statutes.  
In Ontario, treatment is a concept distinct from admission, the latter 
being governed by the Public Hospitals Act71 and the Mental Health 
Act.72 The Health Care Consent Act, 1996 specifically excludes “the 
admission of a person to a hospital or other facility” from the definition 
of “treatment”.73 The act of admission is about whether the person 
requires the care (i.e., that they are sick) and the treatment is an issue to 
be determined following admission.  
                                                                                                                       
70 Conception, supra, note 1, at para. 27. 
71 R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40. 
72 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7. 
73 S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, s. 2(1) “treatment”. 
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The criteria for involuntary admission to hospital under the Mental 
Health Act are not relevant to the admission of unfit accused subject to a 
treatment order and therefore do not assist as a check on hospital power. 
Voluntary admissions are discretionary and guided only by 
considerations of urgency or necessity.74 The Public Hospitals Act 
provides that a hospital must accept a person as an inpatient if (a) the 
person has been admitted to the hospital pursuant to the regulations and 
(b) the person requires the level or type of hospital care for which the 
hospital is approved by the regulations.75 Regulations provide that no 
person shall be admitted to a public hospital except on the order or under 
the authority of a physician and only where clinically necessary.76 
Regulations further define “admitted” as “received and lodged”.77 Under 
the Public Hospitals Act, hospital administrators do not have a role in 
admissions save the requirement that physicians notify them if a patient 
is dangerous or infectious.78 Even that requirement is about notification 
rather than a need to seek permission to the admission. Admission is 
based on need, not capacity or the nature of the patient. There is no 
reason why a patient with a mental illness should be treated any 
differently and, indeed, the statute provides no justification for so doing. 
Therefore, if the Public Hospitals Act is to guide the provision of consent 
to the disposition under section 672.62(1), it must be with respect to the 
clinical criteria outlined in section 672.59 and not to the allocation of 
hospital resources.  
As noted by Karakatsanis J., under Part XX.1 the Court undeniably 
has the ability to make other dispositions that send an unfit accused to be 
admitted to hospital without the consent of a hospital. Hospital consent is 
not required when Review Boards or the Court make dispositions outside 
of section 672.58 that do not impose treatment, including assessment 
orders, annual disposition orders, and placement orders respecting dual 
status offenders.79 That treatment is to be imposed should not be a 
distinguishing factor, since the evidence before the Court was that the 
issue was with the timing, not the provision of treatment. In each of these 
orders that the Courts and review boards can make, there is no consent 
                                                                                                                       
74 Mental Health Act, ss. 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 22, 23, 29, 33; General Regulation (Mental 
Health Act), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 741, s. 7.2(1).  
75 Public Hospitals Act, s. 20.  
76 Hospital Management (Public Hospitals Act), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 965, s. 11(1)(a), (2).  
77 Id., s. 1(1) “admitted”. 
78 Id., s. 14. 
79 Criminal Code, ss. 672.11-672.16, 672.29, 672.46(1), (2), 672.49, 672.54(c), 672.57, 
672.58, 672.68, 672.93. 
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provision. Hospitals do not in other circumstances have the ability to 
prevent an accused from being ordered to its facility. It was argued that, 
because treatment and admission are traditionally distinct in law, the 
consent required by section 672.62(1) relates to an agreement to 
administer the treatment, rather than to a decision to “receive and lodge” 
the patient.80 The Court implicitly rejected this argument favouring an 
interpretation that tied treatment with admission to hospital. 
VII. CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that 
legislation is presumed to conform to international law. Specifically, 
section 672.62(1) must be construed in a manner consistent with 
Canada’s obligations under customary and conventional international law 
and as a signatory of international treaties.81 Yet the Court, despite these 
issues being raised by the intervener MHLC, failed to consider them. Of 
concern is that the decision has the effect of permitting and sanctioning a 
practice of imprisoning unfit accused subject to treatment orders pending 
bed availability without access to needed mental health resources. In 
practical terms, as the evidence demonstrated, this leaves the vulnerable, 
mentally disordered accused in a dangerous and onerous position: he or 
she likely to be isolated or face violence affecting the individual’s safety, 
dignity and/or autonomy. As noted above, health care resources in 
detention facilities is variable. The relevant international conventions and 
norms, many of which Canada has ratified, endorsed or adopted as a 
member of the General Assembly, include the following: 
 All prisoners with mental disability shall be treated with humanity 
and respect for their inherent dignity and autonomy.82 
                                                                                                                       
80 The Medicine Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 30 and the Regulated Health Professions Act, 
1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, also do not govern the conduct of hospitals or medical practitioners in the 
acceptance or treatment of unfit accused subject to treatment orders. 
81 R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, at paras. 53-56, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.).  
82 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111 (1990), Principle 1; 
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health 
Care, G.A. Res. 46/119 (1991), Principles 1(2), 9(4); Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, U.N. Doc. A/61/611 (ratified by Canada March 11, 2010), arts. 1, 3(a), 4(1)(c), 17; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, C.T.S. 1976/47, U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 
368 (ratified by Canada May 19, 1976), art. 10; Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons 
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, annex, (1988), Principle 1. 
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 The abolition of solitary confinement or restriction of its use should 
be undertaken.83 
 Prisoners shall have access to health services without discrimination 
on the grounds of their legal situation.84 
 All persons with mental illness have the right to protection from 
physical or other abuse and degrading treatment.85 
 Disability cannot justify unlawful or arbitrary deprivations of 
liberty.86 
 Any form of detention or imprisonment and all measures affecting 
the human rights of a person under any form of detention or 
imprisonment shall be ordered by, or be subject to, the effective 
control of a judicial or other authority.87 
 Effective access to justice shall be ensured for persons with mental 
disability.88 
 Persons with mental disability shall not be detained in prisons and 
arrangements shall be made to remove them to mental health 
facilities as soon as possible; while in prison, persons with mental 
disability shall be placed under the special supervision of a medical 
officer.89 
                                                                                                                       
83 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, id., Principle 7. 
84 Id., Principle 9. 
85 Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care, supra, note 82, Principles 1(3), 8(2); Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, supra, note 82, art. 15; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, note 
82, art. 7; Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, supra, note 82, Principle 6; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. E/5988, Rule 31. 
86 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra, note 82, art. 14; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, note 82, art. 9. 
87 Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, supra, note 82, Principle 4. 
88 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra, note 82, art. 13(1). 
89 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra, note 85, 
Rule 82. 
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 Every patient with mental disability has the right to be treated in the 
least restrictive environment and with the least restrictive or intrusive 
treatment.90 
 All persons with mental disability, including prisoners, have the right 
to the best available mental health care, which shall be part of the 
health and social care system.91  
 A mental health facility shall have access to the same level of 
resources as any other health establishment and in particular 
qualified medical and other appropriate professional staff in 
sufficient numbers and with adequate space to provide each patient 
with privacy and a program of appropriate and active therapy.92 
Further, interpretation pursuant to the Charter must ensure consistency 
between the meaning of “the full benefit of the Charter” and Canada’s 
international obligations.93 These obligations inform the section 1 Charter 
analysis as well as the consideration of the principles of fundamental 
justice under section 7 of the Charter.94  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Conception represents a 
departure from over three decades of legal developments in the sphere of 
civil and forensic mental health law, which were unified by the principles 
of restraint and oversight. The majority decision effectively sanctions the 
off-loading of that protection of the most vulnerable people in the 
criminal justice system to hospital bureaucrats returning unfit accused to 
a time when they were detained “at pleasure”. While the circumstances 
in which unfit accused will languish are more limited, they will continue 
                                                                                                                       
90 Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care, supra, note 82, Principle 9(1). 
91 Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care, supra, note 82, Principles 1(1), 20; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, supra, note 82, art. 25; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, supra, note 85, Rule 22(1). 
92 Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care, id., Principle 14(1). 
93 Hape, supra, note 81, at paras. 55, 56. 
94 Hape, id., para. 55; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 3, paras. 46, 59-75, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
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to suffer in onerous and untherapeutic situations unable to instruct 
counsel to remedy them. 
It is hard to conceive of a more vulnerable group of people in our 
criminal justice system. It is surprising that the Court relinquished that 
control over them, given that, for over 30 years, the law regarding the 
treatment of mentally disordered offenders developed in a way that 
mandated that the mentally disordered person be dealt with in the least 
onerous, least restrictive way. While the majority’s reliance on the 
Charter permits the Court to have final say, practically speaking, it is 
difficult to conceive of an unfit accused detained in jail being able to 
retain and instruct counsel to advance his or her rights. Having reviewed 
the experience of accused found not criminally responsible on account of 
mental disorder awaiting transfer, we know that even where a tribunal 
orders admission, mentally disordered accused face long and debilitating 
waits.  
The decision essentially acknowledges that unfit accused persons 
may suffer or languish in jail, albeit in “rare” circumstances. Rather than 
maintaining oversight over those accused (as recommended 30 years 
ago) and interpreting the statute in a fashion that prevents a Charter 
breach, the decision leaves it to the most vulnerable accused to complain 
about a violation of their Charter rights. It remains to be seen whether 
Courts will be effective means of remedying a Charter breach where 
hospital resources are limited.  
 
